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ARGUMENT
1. There is no contemporaneous evidence that a trust actually existed in
1965.
In this Reply Brief, Plaintiff/Appellant replies to Defendant/Appellee's
arguments in the chronological order of the events to which they relate.
The first important event occurs in October 1965 when the Bates sold
approximately 4,264.68 acres to "Security Title Company, trustee" by warranty
deed. In Plaintiffs Opening Brief, Plaintiff made the points that (1) under the
doctrine of descriptio personae, the word "trustee" must be disregarded because
there is no extrinsic evidence proving a trust actually existed, and (2) whether or
not a trust existed, by statute the effect of the deed was that Security Title
Company came to own the 4,264.68 acres in fee simple estate.
Defendant has no contemporaneous evidence that a trust existed to counter

5

Plaintiffs first point, but argues that (1) the "fact" that title companies often hold
property in trust, (2) the dicta in the 1981 Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. decision1 to the
effect that Brent Jensen acquired property in the general area in 1970, and (3) the
statements on the 1976 Plat recorded eleven years later require that this Court hold
as a matter of law there actually was a trust in 1965 and that PMRI was its
beneficiary in 1973 when it recorded the 1973 CC&R's.
Plaintiff replies that Defendant is wrong on its facts. Title companies
virtually never act as classic trustees who hold possession of and manage property
for beneficiaries. Title companies do hold title to properties as trustees under trust
deeds, but that is a different thing entirely. As trustees under trust deeds, the title
companies do not possess or manage the properties. The trustors (debtors) possess
and manage the properties. The title companies only holds title as security for
obligations owed to the beneficiaries (lenders). Title companies cannot lawfully
possess and manage property as classic trustees because doing so would be
conducting "trust business" and they are not permitted to conduct trust business.2

1

Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 251 (Utah

1981).
2

Compare Utah Code Ann. sec. 7 - 5 - 1 et seq. (1999)(2004 Pocket Part)
dealing with who can conduct "trust business, with Utah Code Ann. sec. 57 - 1 21 (2000) dealing with who can be a trustee under a deed of trust. In 1965 there
was no statutory prohibition on a title company conducting "trust business," but
6

Plaintiff further replies that even if Respondent's "fact" were true, there is no
judicially recognized exception to the doctrine of descriptio personae for grantees
whose names suggest they may be acting as classic trustees.
Turning to Defendant's second argument (that the dicta in the Bertagnole
decision that Brent Jensen acquired property in 1970 proves there was an actual
trust in 1965). Plaintiff can only reply that if this dicta shows anything, it shows
what it says - that Mr. Jensen bought some property somewhere in the area in
1970 - not that PMRI was a trust beneficiary in 1976. In any event, the dicta
about Mr. Jensen buying property is irrelevant to the holding of that case (that
Tollgate Canyon Road is a public road where it crosses the Bertagnole property),
is not binding on Plaintiff under the principles of res judicata, and is inadmissible
hearsay. Nothing in the decision mentions the existence of a trust - the issue in
this case.
Defendant's third argument is based on the 1973 CC&R's. Plaintiff will
reply to it when that document is reached in chronological order.
To meet Plaintiffs point that PMRI was not in privity of estate with the
successors in interest to the property that is now Plaintiffs lot, Defendant claims
the "fact" that title companies were routinely conducting trust business in 1965 is
beyond the scope of judicial notice under Utah Rule of Evidence 201(b) (facts
"generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court").
7

that the Bates deed "did not vest title in Security Title."
Plaintiff replies that under the statute the effect of the 1965 Bates Deed is
that Security Title took fee simple title because that's what the statute says.3 It
makes no difference under the statute whether the grantee is a trustee or not.
Plaintiff further replies that if this Court holds that the beneficiary and not the
trustee has "title" to the real property held in trust, it will have the consequences
that Defendant aptly describes as a "parade of horribles."
2. The 1973 CC&R's show that PMRI neither owned nor was the
beneficiary of a trustee who owned the 1,200 acres in question.
Continuing in chronological order, on August 15, 1973, W. Brent Jensen
executed the 1973 CC&R's, falsely purporting to do so as the president of "Pine
Meadow Ranch." In fact, the corporation did not exist at that date. In the recitals,
"Declarant" (the non-existent corporation) declares that it "is the owner of or
intends to acquire" the property which it purports to make subject to the 1973
CC&R's.
PMRI was incorporated on August 22, 1973 and the 1973 CC&R's were
recorded on September 28, 1973. Plaintiff concedes that PMRI "adopted" the
1973 CC&R's by recording them after its incorporation, in effect, agreeing to be
3

Utah Code Ann. sec. 5 7 - 1 - 1 2 (2001)(uForm of warranty deed, Effect").
8

bound by the prior unauthorized act of its promoter, W. Brent Jensen. Thus,
PMRTs declaration that it "is the owner of or intends to acquire" should be
taken as made on September 28, 1973.
Plaintiff points out that PMRI did not say it is "the beneficiary of a trust
whose trustee owns" the property. If PMRI had been a trust beneficiary, it would
have said so.
Defendant misrepresents what PMRI said in the 1973 CC&R's in order to
lend support to its case. On page 19, lines 14-15, of Defendant/Appellee's Brief,
Defendant falsely says "PMRI recorded the CC&R's declaring itself the owner of
the property." On page 18, lines 14 and 15, Defendant falsely says "the . . .
CC&R's . . . declare that PMRI was a beneficial owner of the property . . . . " On
page 26, line 14, to page 27, line 2, Defendant falsely says "The PMRI CC&Rs
also recited that PMRI was the owner of "the South one-half of Section 16, the
East Half of the Southeast quarter of Section 17 . . . etc." On page 30 at lines 4 5, Defendant falsely says "it is undisputed that PMRI had recorded CC&R's
declaring it was the owner of the land."
The truth is that PMRI said in the 1973 CC&R's was that it was the owner
of or intends to acquire the 1,200 acres. It did not declare it was the present
owner. More importantly, it did not declare it was the beneficiary of a trust whose
9

trustee was the present owner.
In any case, in Utah the rule is that ownership of real property is
determined from recorded deeds not from inferences drawn from recorded
documents. In Utah, the chain of title is contained in the "grantors' indexes" and
"grantees' indexes" maintained by the county recorders.4 County recorders record
"deeds" and "final judgments or decrees." They do not draw inferences from
other documents and put these inferences into the indexes.
The integrity of the county real estate records will be compromised if
inferences drawn from documents prevail over recorded deeds. In 2003 this Court
preserved the integrity of the county real estate records by its decision in Dunlap
v. Stitchings Mayflower Mountain Fonds.5

The issue in that case was whether

inferences drawn from recorded documents would prevail over recorded deeds.
The recorded deeds won.
Applying the Dunlap holding to the facts in this case, since there is no
recorded deed (or final judgment or decree) in the records transferring ownership
from Security Title to PMRI, it follows that as a matter of law PMRI did not own

4

Utah Code Ann. sec. 17-21-6 (2001)("General duties of recorder - Records
and indexes").
5

2003UTApp.238,76P.3d711.
10

1,200 acres on which it purported to impose the 1973 CC&R's on September 28,
1973. Therefore, the 1973 CC&R's are void unless this Court holds that as a
matter of law the evidence of the 1976 plat proves that (1) there really was a trust
in 1965, (2) PMRI was the beneficiary of that trust on September 28, 1973, (3) the
1,200 acres purportedly covered by the 1973 CC&R's was then an asset held by
the trustee in trust, (4) PMRI as trust beneficiary held the 1,200 acres in fee simple
estate,6 and, (5) PMRI as trust beneficiary had the power to impose the 1973
CC&R's on the 1,200 acres owned of record by Security Title.
3. The Plat recorded May 6,1976, is not competent evidence of the
state of title eleven years earlier in 1965 or three years earlier in 1973.
In chronological order, the next important event is the recordation of the
plat for Pine Meadows Ranch Plat "D" on May 6, 1976. The trial court relied on
the evidence of this plat to hold that as a matter of law that a trust actually existed
eleven years earlier in 1965 when the Bates deeded the land to Security Title
Company, trustee, and that when PMRI recorded the 1973 CC&R's three years
earlier in 1973, it was the beneficiary of the trust as that land.
Plaintiff replies that a plat recorded in 1976 is not competent evidence of the
6

In the companion Forest Meadows case, the trial court held that the
portion of the 1,200 acres in the western part of Section 21 was held by Security
Title in trust for the benefit of Deseret Diversified. The inconsistency is glaring.
11

state of title in 1965, eleven years earlier, or 1973, three years earlier. Under the
holding of the Dunlap decision, title is determined from recorded deeds, not from
inferences drawn from recorded documents - much less documents recorded in the
remote future. Plaintiff further replies that the only indication that a trust existed
in 1976 on the plat is the use of the word "trustee" as part of the name "Security
Title Company, trustee" and the law presumes that use as part of a name is merely
descriptive. Plaintiff further replies that the Owner's Dedication on a plat is like a
quitclaim deed in that the persons who sign need not actually have any ownership
interest. As in the case of the plats for Pine Meadows Ranch Subdivisions "E,"
"F," "G," and "I," recorded in 1987, what the 1976 plat shows is that at the time it
was recorded (eleven years after the 1965 Bates Deed), the persons who signed as
owners may or may not have had some ownership interest in the covered land.
Plaintiff further replies that the plat describes both Security Title and PMRI as
owners (as opposed to describing Security Title as trustee of a trust for the benefit
of PMRI) without specifying what they own, if anything, except for the streets,
which the "Subdividers Note" says are owned by PMRI.
Perhaps Defendant is counting on this Court not actually looking at the plat
(addendum document ""4" in Plaintiffs Opening Brief) and seeing what it actually
says. What the "Owners Dedication" says is that both "Pine Meadow Ranch" and
12

"Security Title Co., Trustee" are owners. What the "Subdividers Note" says is that
the streets will remain the property of "Pine Meadow Ranch." Nothing on the plat
indicates that Security Title Company was the trustee for the benefit of PMRI, and
the active role taken by Pine Meadow Ranch in maintaining the streets is
inconsistent with its having been a trust beneficiary.
Defendant falsely asserts "the recorded Plat D reflected PMRI as the owner
of the property and Security Title as trustee."7 PMRI is shown as an owner, but
the plat does not state what it owns (except for the streets). Security Title
Company is also shown as an owner. Defendant then falsely asserts "plat D
clearly reflects Security Title as the trustee of the property and PMRI as owners of
the property" 8 as if repeating the false assertion will make it true. Finally,
Defendant caps it off by falsely asserting "Moreover, it is undisputed that PMRI
had recorded the CC&Rs declaring that it was the owner of the land." 9
Defendant knows very well that what PMRI actually declared was "it was the
owner of or intends to acquire" the 1,200 acres.
Defendant argues that the Surveyor's certificate on the plat to the effect that

7

Defendant/Appellee's Brief, p. 30, lines 2 - 3 .

8

Id, p. 30, lines 3 - 4.

9

Id. p. 30, lines 4 - 5 .
13

he made a survey "by authority of the owners" proves that PMRI owned the land
covered by the plat.10 Plaintiff can only reply that Defendant's argument makes no
sense at all.
This Court should stick to the rule of the Dunlap decision that ownership of
land is to be determined by recorded deeds, not from inferences from recorded
documents or from "common knowledge and reputation" as Defendant argues.11
4. The "subject to" clauses in the deeds in Plaintiff's chain of title only
limit the grantors' covenants and do not deny Plaintiff "standing" to
challenge any lien or encumbrance.
In chronological order, the next important event is the start of the chain of
deeds that begins with Security Title Company conveying lot 6 to Mountainland
Properties, Inc. in July 1977, and ends with Raymond Blanchard conveying the lot
to Plaintiff on January 19, 1999. Defendant asserts that "Mountainland
Properties" was "another [W. Brent] Jensen entity. Defendant's assertion is
probably false. "Leo D. Jensen," a vice president of Security Title, signed the
deed for it as grantor. Later, Mountainland acting through "Brent Sutherland"

10

Id., p. 25 line 20 - p. 26, line 2.

11

Id., p. 27, lines 8 - 10. Plaintiff does not agree that this is "common
knowledge and reputation."
14

deeded the property to Ryan in 1980. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to ask
counsel for Defendant during oral argument what is the basis for his assertion that
Mountainland Properties was "another Jensen entity." Is this another false claim?
In any case, in the 1977 Security Title to Mountainland deed the following
clause appears immediately following the property description:
"SUBJECT TO easements, restrictions, reservations, covenants and rights of
way appearing of record and general property taxes." [R0089]
Defendant argues that the effect of this clause is to validate the 1973
CC&R's in the sense that Mountainland and all its successors in interest will
henceforth lacked "standing" to challenge the 1973 CC&R's or any other
"easements, restrictions, covenants and rights of way appearing of record."
Plaintiff replies that the only effect of this clause is to limit the grantor's
covenants. Defendant is confusing two issues. One is the issue of whether
successors in interest can claim the extraordinary rights of a purchaser without
notice. They cannot. The second issue is whether successors in interest can claim
the right of their grantor to contest a lien or encumbrance. They can. Plaintiff will
discuss the legal effect of "subject to" clauses below in connection with his
purchase of the lot in 1999.
5. The dissolution of PMRI on December 31,1979, shows that it neither

15

owned, nor was the beneficiary of a trustee who owned, the property
purportedly covered by the 1973 CC&R'sIn chronological order, the next important event is the dissolution of Pine
Meadow Ranch, Inc. on December 31, 1979, for failing to file its annual report
[Cert, of dissolution, R0383, addendum doc. "10" in Plaintiffs Opening Brief].
The Court will recall that the property description in the 1973 CC&R's
covers approximately 1,200 acres which PMRI says it is "either the owner of or
intends to acquire" as of September 28, 1973, and Defendant argues that this
declaration proves that PMRI was really a trust beneficiary whose trustee owned
all those 1,200 acres.
Plaintiff replies that if PMRI had such valuable rights, it would not have
failed to file its annual report and let itself be dissolved without first conveying
those valuable rights to someone - and there is no deed or other evidence it did so.
On the other hand, if PMRI owned nothing (or owned a white elephant like the
streets) it would been happy to let itself be dissolved.
6. The 1980 Notice of Lien is a wrongful lien because it was not signed
by the owner of record, Security Title.
The next important event is that Defendant filed the 1980 Notice of Lien.
Why?
16

The Court will recall that the plat for Forest Meadow Plat "D" has a
subdivider's note that says the streets are to be maintained by PMRI. But, on
December 31, 1979, PMRI was dissolved for failing to file its annual report. A
reasonable inference is that Defendant decided to claim the right to assess the lots
because it was planning to take over for PMRI and maintain the streets. But, the
1980 Notice of Lien was not signed by Security Title and, of course, PMRI,
whom Defendant asserts was the true owner, no longer existed, so it could not sign
it either. Therefore, under the statute the 1980 Notice of Lien is a wrongful lien.
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time
it is recorded or filed is not: . . . (c) signed by or authorized pursuant to
a document signed by the owner of the real property.12
In any event, Defendant did not actually make any assessments at this time.
Which leads to the next significant event, the creation of the special service
district.
7. The creation of the special service district in 1985 made the validity
of the 1973 CC&R's moot until it was dissolved in 2000.
The next important event is the creation of the special service district in
1985. This solved the problems that the various CC&R's (not only the Fabricated

12

Utah Code Ann. sec. 38 - 9 - 1 (6) (2001) ("Definitions").
17

1971 CC&R's and the 1973 CC&R's, but also an additional set of CC&R's
covering only Pine Meadows Plat "A") were not uniform and had not been signed
by the owner of record. For fifteen years, from 1985 to 2000, the SSD maintained
the roads and provided services with Summit County assessing the lots under its
statutory authority. The various CC&R's were dead letters until the County
dissolved the SSD in 2000 and Defendant decided to claim the right to assess all
the lots in all the subdivisions for annual maintenance assessments (regardless of
whether they were authorized by the applicable CC&R's or whether there any
applicable CC&R's) under the 1980 Notice of Lien.
8. The platting of the additional subdivisions in 1987 shows that PMRI
neither owned nor was the beneficiary of a trustee who owned the property
purportedly covered by the 1973 CC&R's.
The next significant event is the platting of Pine Meadow Ranch
Subdivisions "E," "F," "G," and 'T in 1987. "Security Title Company, trustee"
signed all of the plats as an owner (along with other people who owned other
portions of the covered land in the case of "E," "F," and "G," but as sole owner in
the case of "I"). In short, it behaved just as if there was no trust, which is exactly
the way it had behaved when it signed plat D some eleven years earlier. It could
not have been the trustee for PMRI in 1987 because PMRI had long since been
18

dissolved. But, the new subdivisions have areas within the 1,200 acres
purportedly covered by the 1973 CC&R's.
9. The fact that Plaintiff bought the lot with actual and constructive
notice of the 1973 CC&R's and the 1980 Notice of Lien is irrelevant under the
law because he also acquired the right to challenge them.
The next important event is Plaintiff buying Pine Meadow Ranch Lot 6 D in
January 1999. Plaintiff freely admits he actually knew of the 1973 CC&R's and
the 1980 Notice of Lien, but he believed they were unenforceable because PMRI
didn't own the property at the time it purported to impose them and, in any case,
they were moot because at that time the SSD was providing all the subdivision
services with Summit County making assessments under its statutory authority.
Defendant argues that the consequence of the inclusion of the "subject to"
clause in the deed by which Plaintiff acquired the property is that Plaintiff has no
standing to challenge the 1980 Notice of Lien and the 1973 CC&R's. The clause
in the Blanchard to Peters deed reads: "Subject to easements, covenants
restrictions, rights of way and reservations appearing of record and, taxes for the
year 1999, and each year thereafter."13
Plaintiff replies that the Utah Supreme Court held in Hancock v. Planned
13

Addendum doc. "14" in Plaintiff/Appellant's Opening Brief.
19

Development Corp. in 1990 that the only effect of that language in a deed is to
limit the covenants of the grantor. By statute,15 the effect of each of the deeds in
Plaintiffs chain of title is to convey all the rights of the grantor to the grantee,
including, without limitation, the right to challenge the validity of the 1973
CC&R's and the validity of the 1980 Notice of Lien.
The Utah Supreme Court expressly rejected a stronger version of
Defendant's argument in Ault v. Holden,16 in 2002. In Ault, the "subject to" clause
in the deed conveying the property to the Aults had read "subject to the rights of
parties in possession" of the premises covered by the property description in the
deed. In fact, the Holdens were in open possession of part of the premises and the
Supreme Court held that the Aults had notice of that fact. The Holdens argued
that the effect of the clause was to validate their rights. The Utah Supreme Court
disagreed:
"The clause in the Ault deed does not create any rights in the Holdens, but
rather was only a recognition that parties in possession may have rights in
the property 'against which the grantor did not warrant title.' Johnson v.
Peck, 90 Utah 544, 550, 63 P.2d 251, 254 (1936)."17
14

791 P2d 183 (Utah 1990).

15

Utah Code Ann sec. 5 7 - 1 - 1 2 (2000)("Forni of warranty deed - Effect").

16
17

2002UT33,44P.3d781.
2002 UT 33 at para. 40, 44 P.3d at 792.
20

The Utah Supreme Court went on to discuss the Hancock decision:
"In Hancock, the trial court determined that the language in a deed that
stated the deed was 'subject to a fence line encroachment along the east
line' reserved in the grantor the property east of the fence line, 'which
otherwise would have passed under the metes and bounds description." 791
P.2d at 185. However, we determined that the clause did not reserve the
property to the grantor, but rather placed the grantee on notice that another
may attempt to acquire the property by boundary by acquiescence "in order
to insulate herself from a suit by . . . grantee . . . In the event [that a
claim of title to the strip of land by acquiescence proved to be valid.' Id. at
185 - 86. Thus, we concluded that the defendant could obtain title to
property only by boundary by acquiescence, not under the "subject to"
clause of the deed. Id. at 187" 18 .
Ault and Hancock were stronger cases for the claimant than this case. The
claimants in those cases were in open possession and the "subject to" clause spoke
directly to their open possession. In this case, when Plaintiff acquired the lot, the
CC&R's that had been a dead letter for 26 years and the "subject to" clause spoke
in general terms. In both Ault and Holden the Supreme Court held that the only
effect of the subject to clause was only to limit the covenants of the grantor, not to
prevent the new owner from challenging the claims of the claimants.
It is true that Defendant frames its argument in terms of "standing," which is
original in the sense of being without precedent. It is also true that Defendant
seeks to validate an encumbrance, not validate possession, but the difference in the

2002 UT 33 at para. 40, 44 P.3d at 792.
21

words used and the interest involved make no difference under the law.
This is an action to quiet title under Utah Code Ann. sec. 78 - 40 - 1, so if
this Court denies Plaintiff standing to challenge an encumbrance that was of
record before he bought the property, it will have far reaching consequences for
virtually all purchasers of real property. All encumbrances of record will be
validated by sale, no matter how wrongful they may be, because the "subject to"
clause appears in virtually every Utah warranty deed.
10. Plaintiff's action is timely because he brought it as soon as
Defendant threatened to start making assessments.
One of the grounds for the trial court's decision was its holding that
Plaintiffs action was "untimely." Defendant argues that the fact that the 1973
CC&R's had been on the books for 26 years before Plaintiff bought his lot in 1999
means he cannot challenge them now.
Plaintiff replies that he brought this action as an owner in possession to
remove a cloud on his title and under the 1915 decision of the Utah Supreme
Court in Branting v. Salt Lake City19 the statute of limitations never runs against

47 Utah 296, 153 P. 995 (1915).
22

him. This may seem extraordinary, but it is the general rule.
The rule responds to a conundrum perfectly illustrated by this case. Should
the statute run against the claimant for not asserting the claim or should the statute
run against the property owner for not challenging the claim?
Turning first to look at the claimant, in this case the 1973 CC&R's were a
dead letter for the twenty-seven years from their recordation in 1973 until 2000
when Defendant made its first assessment. Of course, the fact that the SSD was
providing the services from 1985 to 2000 meant that Defendant had no reason to
make assessments for the last fifteen of those twenty-seven years.
Turning next to look at the Plaintiff, it is true that Plaintiffs predecessors in
interest did not bring an action to quiet title during the twenty-six year period
before Plaintiff bought the lot. But, again, the existence of the SSD made it
pointless to make a challenge during the last fifteen of those years. The
conundrum always cuts both ways.
The Utah Supreme Court solved the conundrum in Brandt. It held that the
statute of limitations never runs against an owner in possession with respect to
removing an encumbrance on his title, but it does run to the extent he seeks

20

51 AM.JUR.2D "Quieting Title" sec. 51 at p. 39 (2001); 74 C.J.S.
"Quieting Title" sec. 55 at pp. 49 - 50 (2002).
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affirmative relief (e.g. damages). Thus, invalid encumbrances do not become
valid by sitting quietly on the real estate records for a hundred years, but if an
assessment has been made and paid, an action by Plaintiff for a refund must be
brought within the applicable period.21
11. The "parade of horribles" will occur if this Court holds a trust
beneficiary has power of disposition over the assets held by the trustee in
trust because the cause of the parade of horribles is equating "trust
beneficiary" with "owner."
Plaintiff pointed out in its Opening Brief that if this Court holds that a trust
beneficiary has power of disposition over the property held by the trustee in trust,
it will have catastrophic consequences. In a footnote Defendant argues that this
"parade of horribles" will not occur because of "the reality that PMRI was the
property owner and Security Title acted as trustee in holding the title for PMRI."
Plaintiff replies that what would cause of the parade of horribles is this
Court holding that a trust beneficiary is "the owner" of the property held by the
trustee, and that is exactly what Defendant is claiming - that PMRI is both

21

The period is four years from the last assessment since the action is "on
an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished,"
Utah Code Ann. sec. 78 - 12 - 25 (2002) ("Within four years"). State of Utah v.
Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, 52 P.3d 1257.
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"owner" and "trust beneficiary." If this Court does not distinguish between
"owner" and "trust beneficiary," neither will the people who deal with trust
beneficiaries, or the bankruptcy trustees, or the IRS.
12. Assuming arguendo PMRI was the beneficiary of a trust, there is no
privity of estate necessary to make the covenants run with the land.
Defendant falsely states Plaintiffs argument on privity of estate. Plaintiffs
actual argument on privity of estate is that, whether or not there really was a trust,
the effect of the 1965 Bates Deed was to convey the whole 4,264.68 acres to
Security Title in fee simple estate, so it had the only "estate" in the land and PMRI
had no estate. Defendant falsely restates this argument as that "since no trust
existed" PMRI could not impose the CC&R's. Defendant then says "to the
contrary, "agents and trustees have no direct beneficial interest in the property to
which they hold title," citing the Capital Assets decision.22 There is no logical
connection between Defendant's two sentences.
The Capital Assets decision holds that under the Utah Judgment Lien Act a
judgment creditor with a judgment against a trustee does not get a lien against the
assets held by the trustee in trust for others. It has nothing to do with this case.

Capital Asset Financial Services v. Maxwell, 994 P.2d 201 (Utah 2000).
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Respectfully submitted this 19 day of November, 2004,

I si Boyd/Kimball Dyer
Counsel ua^rlaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "17" - STATUTES CITED

TRUST BUSINESS
Section
7-5-1.
7-5-2.
7-5-5.
7-5-7.
7-5-9.

Definitions — Allowable trust companies — Exceptions.
Permit required to engage in trust
business — Exceptions.
Revocation of trust authority — Procedure.
Management and investment of
trust funds.
Registration of investment in name
of nominee — Records — Possession of investment.

Section
7-5-10.
7-5-14.

Lending trust funds to trust company, officer, director, or employee
as felony.
Mergers, consolidations, acquisitions, transfers, or reorganizations
involving entities engaged in trust
business — Succession of rights
^ d u t i e s _ Petition for appointm e n t o f ^fa^
tnist
com pany.

7-5-1. Definitions — Allowable trust companies — Exceptions.
(1) As used in this chapter:
(a) "Business trust" means an entity engaged in a trade or business that
is created by a declaration of trust that transfers property to trustees, to
be held and managed by them for the benefit of persons holding certificates
representing the beneficial interest in the trust estate and assets.
(b) "Trust business" means, except as provided in Subsection (l)(c), a
business in which one acts in any agency or fiduciary capacity, including
that of personal representative, executor, administrator, conservator,
guardian, assignee, receiver, depositary, or trustee under appointment as
trustee for any purpose permitted by law, including the definition of
"trust" set forth in Subsection 75-1-201(53).
(c) "Trust business" does not include the following means of holding
funds, assets, or other property:
(i) funds held in a client trust account by an attorney authorized to
practice law in this state;
(ii) funds held in connection with the purchase or sale of real estate
by a person authorized to act as a real estate broker in this state;
(iii) funds or other assets held in escrow by a person authorized by
the department in accordance with Chapter 22 or by the Utah
Insurance Department to act as an escrow agent in this state;
(iv) funds held by a homeowners' association or similar organization to pay maintenance and other related costs for commonly owned
property;
(v) funds held in connection with the collection of debts or payments on loans by a person acting solely as the agent or representative or otherwise at the sole direction of the person to which the debt
or payment is owed, including funds held by an escrow agent for
payment of taxes or insurance;
(vi) funds and other assets held in trust on an occasional or isolated
basis by a person who does not represent that he is engaged in the
trust business in Utah;

(vii) funds or other assets found by a court to be held in an implied,
resulting, or constructive trust;
(viii) funds or other assets held by a court appointed conservator,
guardian, receiver, trustee, or other fiduciary if:
(A) the conservator, receiver, guardian, trustee, or other fiduciary is responsible to the court in the same manner as a personal
representative under Title 75, Chapter 3, Part 5, Supervised
Administration, or as a receiver under Rule 66, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure;
(B) the conservator, trustee, or other fiduciary is a certified
public accountant or has qualified for and received a designation
as a certified financial planner, chartered financial consultant,
certified financial analyst, or similar designation suitable to the
court, that evidences the conservator's, trustee's, or other fiduciary's professional competence to manage financial matters;
(C) no trust company is willing or eligible to serve as conservator, guardian, trustee, or receiver after notice has been given
pursuant to Section 75-1-401 to all trust companies doing business in this state, including a statement of the value of the assets
to be managed. That notice need not be provided, however, if a
trust company has been employed by the fiduciary to manage the
assets; and
(D) in the event guardianship services are needed, the person
seeking appointment as a guardian under this Subsection (1) is a
specialized care professional, as that term is defined in Section
75-5-311, or a business or state agency that employs the services
of one of those professionals for the purpose of caring for the
incapacitated person, so long as the specialized care professional,
business, or state agency does not:
(I) profit financially or otherwise from, or receive compensation for acting in that capacity, except for the direct costs of
providing guardianship or conservatorship services; or
(II) otherwise have a conflict of interest in providing those
services;
(ix) funds or other assets held by a credit services organization
operating in compliance with Title 13, Chapter 21, Credit Services
Organizations Act;
(x) funds, securities, or other assets held in a customer account in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities by a regulated
securities broker, dealer, or transfer agent; or
(xi) funds, assets, and other property held in a business trust for
the benefit of holders of certificates of beneficial interest if the
fiduciary activities of the business trust are merely incidental to
conducting business in the business trust form.
(d) "Trust company* means an institution authorized to engage in the
trust business under this chapter. Only the following may be ; a trust
company:
(i) a Utah depository institution or its wholly owned subsidiary;
(ii) an out-of-state depository institution authorized to engage in
business as a depository institution in Utah or its wholly owned
subsidiary;
(iii) a corporation, including a credit union service organization,
owned entirely by one or more federally insured depository institutions as defined in Subsection 7-1-103(8);

(iv) a direct or indirect subsidiary of a depository institution
holding company that also has a direct or indirect subsidiary authorized to engage in business as a depository institution in Utah; and
(v) any other corporation continuously and lawfully engaged in the
trust business in this state since before July 1, 1981.
(2) Only a trust company may engage in the trust business in this state.
(3) The requirements of this chapter do not apply to:
(a) an institution authorized to engage in a trust business in another
state that is engaged in trust activities in this state solely to fulfill its
duties as a trustee of a trust created and administered in another state;
(b) a national bank, federal savings bank, federal savings and loan
association, or federal credit union authorized to engage in business as a
depository institution in Utah, or any wholly owned subsidiary of any of
these, to the extent the institution is authorized by its primary federal
regulator to engage in the trust business in this state; or
(c) a state agency that is otherwise authorized by statute to act as a
conservator, receiver, guardian, trustee, or in any other fiduciary capacity.
History: C. 1953, 7-5-1, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 16, § 6; 1982, ch. 6, § 1; 1986, ch. 1,
§ 11; 1989, ch. 267, § 26; 1991, ch. 133, § 14;
1994, ch. 200, § 37; 1995, ch. 49, § 24; 1997,
ch. 161, § 1; 1998, ch. 39, § 1; 2003, ch. 301,
§ 1Amendment Notes. —- The 1995 amendment, effective June 1, 1995, substituted "an
out-of-state" for "a foreign" in Subsection
UXdXii) and, in Subsection (3)(a), substituted
"an institution" for "a person that is," substituted that for or territory of the United
WhlCh
^ F ^ ^ f ^ r r ^ ™ ^
'
and substituted to fulfill for for the purpose
ffilfffi'
"
° The 1997 amendment, effective May 5,1997,
rewrote Subsection (l)(c)(viii), inserting

"guardian" and "trustee, or other fiduciary" in
the introductory phrase and substituting Subsections (l)(c)(viii)(A) to (D) for "if the conservatorship or receivership is under continuous
court supervision and no trust company is willing or eligible to serve as conservator or receiver," and added Subsection (3)(c)> making a
stylistic change.
^ 1 9 9 8 amendment, effective July 1, 1998,
s u b s tituted "Subsection 75-1-201(53)" for "Subs e c t i o n 7 5 . 1 . 2 01(45r in Subsection (l)(b).
^ 2 0 0 3 a m e n d m e n t > e f f e c t i v e DeC ember 31,
2003, added Subsection (D(dXiii) and made
, , ,
, , ,. ,. ,
related and stylistic changes.
Cross-References. - Business Trust RegOration Act, Title 16, Chapter 15.

7-5-2. Permit required to engage in trust business —
Exceptions.
(1) No trust company shall accept any appointment to act in any agency or
fiduciary capacity, such as but not limited to that of personal representative,
executor, administrator, conservator, guardian, assignee, receiver, depositary,
or trustee under order or judgment of any court or by authority of any law of
this state or as trustee for any purpose permitted by law or otherwise engage
in the trust business in this state, unless and until it has obtained from the
commissioner a permit to act under this chapter. This provision shall not apply
to any bank or other corporation authorized to engage and lawfully engaged in
the trust business in this state before July 1, 1981.
(2) Nothing in this chapter prohibits:
(a) any corporation organized under Title 16, Chapter 6a or 10a, from
acting as trustee of any employee benefit trust established for the
employees of the corporation or the employees of one or more other
corporations affiliated with the corporation;
(b) any corporation organized under Title 16, Chapter 6a, Utah Revised
Nonprofit Corporation Act, and owned or controlled by a charitable,
benevolent, eleemosynary, or religious organization from acting as a

trustee for that organization or members of that organization but not
offering trust services to the general public;
(c) any corporation organized under Title 16, Chapter 6a or 10a, from
holding in a fiduciary capacity the controlling shares of another corporation but not offering trust services to the general public; or
(d) any depository institution from holding in an agency or fiduciary
capacity individual retirement accounts or Keogh plan accounts established under Section 401(a) or 408(a) of Title 26 of the United States Code.
ffistory: C. 1953, 7-5-2, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 16, § 6; 1982, ch. 6, § 2; 2000, ch.
300
> § 5Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, in Subsections

(2)(a) and (2)(c) substituted "Chapter 6a or 10a"
for "Chapter (> or 10*; substituted "Chapter 6a,
Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act" for
"Chapter 6" in Subsection (2)(b); and made a
stylistic change.

17-21-6. General duties of recorder — Records and indexes.
(1) Each recorder shall:
(a) keep an entry record, in which the recorder shall, upon acceptance of
any instrument, enter the instrument in the* order of its reception, the
names of the parties to the instrument, its date, the hour, the day of the
month and the year of recording, and a brief description, and endorse upon
each instrument a number corresponding with the number of the entry;
(b) keep a grantors' index, in which the recorder shall index deeds and
final judgments or decrees partitioning or affecting the title to or possession of real property, which shall show the entry number of the instrument, the name of each grantor in alphabetical order, the name of the
grantee, the date of the instrument, the time of recording, the kind of
instrument, the book and page, and a brief description;
(c) keep a grantees' index, in which the recorder shall index deeds and
final judgments or decrees partitioning or affecting the title to or possession of real property, which shall show the entry number of the instrument, the name of each grantee in alphabetical order, the name of the
grantor, the date of the instrument, the time of recording, the kind of
instrument, the book and page, and a brief description;
(d) keep a mortgagors' index, in which the recorder shall enter all
mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and other instruments in the nature of an
encumbrance upon real estate, which shall show the entry number of the
instrument, the name of each mortgagor, debtor, or person charged with
the encumbrance in alphabetical order, the name of the mortgagee, lien
holder, creditor, or claimant, the date of the instrument, the time of
recording, the instrument, consideration, the book and page, and a brief
description;
(e) keep a mortgagees' index, in which the recorder shall enter all
mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and other instruments in the nature of an

encumbrance upon real estate, which shall show the entry number of the
instrument, the name of each mortgagee, lien holder, creditor, or claimant,
in alphabetical order, the name of the mortgagor or person charged with
the encumbrance, the date of the instrument, the time of recording, the
kind of instrument, the consideration, the book and page, and a brief
description;
(f) keep a tract index, which shall show by description every instrument
recorded, the date and the kind of instrument, the time of recording, and
the book and page and entry number;
(g) keep an index of recorded maps, plats, and subdivisions;
(h) keep an index of powers of attorney showing the date and time of
recording, the book, the page, and the entry number;
(i) keep a miscellaneous index, in which the recorder shall enter all
instruments of a miscellaneous character not otherwise provided for in
this section, showing the date of recording, the book, the page, the entry
number, the kind of instrument, from, to, and the parties;
(j) keep an index of judgments showing the judgment debtors, the
judgment creditors, the amount of judgment, the date and time of
recording, the satisfaction, and the book, the page, and the entry number;
and
(k) keep a general recording index in which the recorder shall index all
executions and writs of attachment, and any other instruments not
required by law to be spread upon the records, and in separate columns
the recorder shall enter the names of the plaintiffs in the execution and
the names of the defendants in the execution.
(2) The recorder shall alphabetically arrange the indexes required by this
section and keep a reverse index.
(3) The tract index required by Subsection (l)(f) shall be kept so that it
shows a true chain of title to each tract or parcel, together with their
encumbrances, according to the records of the office.
(4) Nothing in this section prevents the recorder from using a single name
index if that index includes all of the indexes required by this section.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 620; L.
1915,ch.45,§ 1;C.L. 1917, § 1579; R.S.1933
& C. 1943,19-18-6; L. 1955, ch. 29, § 1; 1973,
ch. 24, § 1; 1980, ch. 20, § 2; 1983, ch. 69, § 5;
1999, ch. 85, § 5; 2001, ch. 241, § 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, rewrote the section.
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30,
2001, in Subsection (l)(h) deleted "labeled 'powers of attorney'" near the beginning and added
"and time" after "the date"; in Subsection (l)(j)

deleted "labeled 'judgments', each page divided
into columns headed, respectively" near the
beginning and added "the book, the page, and
the entry number" at the end; and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References.
—
Condominium
projects, duty to keep index, § 57-8-12.
Federal tax liens, § 38-6-1.
Marketable record title, notice of claim of
interest, § 57-9-5.
Recording as imparting notice, § 57-3-102 et
seq.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Section
25-5-1.
25-5-2.
25-5-3.
25-5-4.
25-5-5.

Estate or interest in real property.
Wills and implied trusts excepted.
Leases and contracts for interest in
lands.
Certain agreements void unless written and signed.
Representation as to credit of third
person.

Section
25-5-6.
25-5-7.
25-5-8.

25-5-9.

Promise to answer for obligation of
another — When not required to
be in writing.
Contracts by telegraph deemed written.
Right to specific performance not affected.
Agent may sign for principal.

25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property.
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or
in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1974,
2461; C.L. 1917, §§ 4874, 5811; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 33-5-1.
Cross-References. — Contract for sale of
goods for $500 or more unenforceable in absence of some writing, § 70A-2-201.

Enforceability of security interests, § 70A-9203.
Securities sales, statute of frauds inapplicable, § 70A-8-112.
Statute of frauds for kinds of personal property not otherwise covered, § 70A-1-206.

WRONGFUL LIEN
Section
38-9-1.
3S-9-2.
38-9-3
38-9-4.
38-9-5.

Definitions.
Scope.
County recorder may reject wrongful
lien within scope of employment —
Good faith requirement.
Civil liability for filing wrongful lien
— Damages.
Criminal liability for filing a wrongful lien — Penalties.

38-9-1.

Section
38-9-6.
38-9-7.

Petition to file lien — Notice to
record interest holders — Summary relief — Contested petition.
Petition to nullify Hen — Notice to
lien claimant — Summary relief—
Finding of wrongful lien — Wrongful lien is void.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present,
lawful property interest in certain real property, including an owner, title
holder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner.
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property
who offers a document for recording or filing with any county recorder in
the state asserting a lien or other claim of interest in certain real property.
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in
certain real property.
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a
present, lawful property interest in certain real property, including an
owner, titleholder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose
name and interest in that real property appears in the county recorder's
records for the county in which the property is located.
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in certain real property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's
records for the county in which the property is located.
(6) "Wrongful hen" means any document that purports to create a lien
or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the
time it is recorded or filed is not:
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal
S

(W authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction in the state; or
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the
owner of the real property.

History: C. 1953, 38-9-1, enacted by L.
19

R 7 epSis 125 akd 2 'Reenactmeats. - Laws
1997 ch 125 § 2, repeals former § 38-9-1, as

enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 182, § 1, relating to
the liability of a person filing a wrongful lien,
aTd^acts^e^present section. See §§ 38-9-4
and 38-9-5 for present k a b i t y p r o t o n s .

57-1-12. Form of warranty deed — Effect.
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the following form:
WARRANTY DEED
(here insert name), grantor, of
(insert place of
residence), hereby conveys and warrants to
(insert name),
grantee, of
(insert place of residence), for the sum of
dollars, the following described tract
of land in
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this
(month/day/year).
A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises
therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights, and privileges
thereunto belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs, and personal
representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the premises; that he has good
right to convey the same; that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs, and
assigns in the quiet possession thereof; that the premises are free from all
encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs, and personal representatives
will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs, and
assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to these covenants may be briefly inserted in the deed following the description of the land.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1981;
CX. 1917, § 4881; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,78-111; L. 2000, ch. 75, § 20.
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-

ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date
line in the waranty deed form and made stylistic changes.

57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds — Qualifications.
(1) (a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be:
(i) any active member of the Utah State Bar who maintains a place
within the state where the trustor or other interested parties may
meet with the trustee to:
(A) request information about what is required to reinstate or
payoff the obligation secured by the trust deed;
(B) deliver written communications to the lender as required
by. both the trust deed and by law;
(C) deliver funds to reinstate or payoff the loan secured by the
trust deed; or
(D) deliver funds by a bidder at a foreclosure sale to pay for the
purchase of the property secured by the trust deed.
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or
insurance company authorized to do business and actually doing
business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the United States;
(hi) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business and
actually conducting a trust business in Utah under the laws of Utah
or the United States;
(iv) any title insurance company or agency that:
(A) holds a certificate of authority or license under Title 31A,
Insurance Code, to conduct insurance business in the state;
(B) is actually doing business in the state; and
(C) maintains a bona fide office in the state;
(v) any agency of the United States government; or
(vi) any association or corporation that is licensed, chartered, or
regulated by the Farm Credit Administration or its successor.
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (1), a person maintains a bona fide
office within the state if that person maintains a physical office in the
state:
(i) that is open to the public;
(ii) that is staffed during regular business hours on regular business days; and
(iii) at which a trustor of a trust deed may in person:
(A) request information regarding a trust deed; or
(B) deliver funds, including reinstatement or payoff funds.
(c) Subsection (1) is not applicable to a trustee of a trust deed existing
prior to May 14, 1963, nor to any agreement that is supplemental to that
trust deed.
(d) The amendments in Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 2002, to this
Subsection (1) apply only to a trustee that is appointed on or after May 6,
2002.
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed,
unless the beneficiary is quaUfied to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(a)(ii),
(iii), (v), or (vi).
(3) The power of sale conferred by Section 57-1-23 may only be exercised by
the trustee of a trust deed if the trustee is qualified under Subsection (l)(a)(i)
or (iv).
(4) A trust deed with an unqualified trustee or without a trustee shall be
effective to create a hen on the trust property, but the power of sale and other
trustee powers under the trust deed may be exercised only if the beneficiary
has appointed a qualified successor trustee under Section 57-1-22.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 3; 1963, ch.
110, § 1; 1969, ch. 162, § 1; 1985, ch. 64, § 1;
1996, ch. 182, § 25; 2001, ch. 236, § 2; 2002,

ch. 209, § 1; 2004, ch. 177, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, added the words

"active" and "residing in Utah" to Subsection
(l)(a)(i); added "and actually doing business" in
Subsections (l)(a)(ii) and (iv); added "and actually conducting a trust business" in Subsection
UXaXiii); added Subsections (3) and (4); and
made stylistic changes.
The 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002,
added Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B) and made related
changes; rewrote Subsection (l)(a)(iv); added
Subsections (l)(b) and (l)(d); redesignated former Subsection (l)(b) as (l)(c) and substituted
"May 14, 1963" for "the effective date of this

57-4a-4.

chapter"; and deleted "prior to the exercise of
those powers" after "only if" in Subsection (4).
The 2004 amendment, effective May 3, 2004,
substituted the ending to Subsection (l)(a)(i)
beginning "maintains a place" for "(A) resides in
Utah; or (B) maintains a bona fide office in the
state" and made stylistic changes.
Coordination clause. — Laws 2002, ch.
209, § 8 directed the substitution of "Chapter
209, Laws of Utah 2002" for "this act" in Subsection (l)(d).

Presumptions.

(1) A recorded document creates the following presumptions regarding title
to the real property affected:
(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by the person
purporting to execute it;
(b) the person executing the document and the person on whose behalf
it is executed are the persons they purport to be;
(c) the person executing the document was neither incompetent nor a
minor at any relevant time;
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time between dates
on the document and the date of recording;
(e) any necessary consideration was given;
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created or
described by the document acted in good faith at all relevant times;
(g) a person executing a document as an agent, attorney in fact, officer
of an organization, or in a fiduciary or official capacity:
(i) held the position he purported to hold and acted within the scope
of his authority;
(ii) in the case of an officer of an organization, was authorized
under all applicable laws to act on behalf of the organization; and
(iii) in the case of an agent, his agency was not revoked, and he
acted for a principal who was neither incompetent nor a minor at any
relevant time;
(h) a person executing the document as an individual:
(i) was unmarried on the effective date of the document; or
(ii) if it otherwise appears from the document that the person was
married on the effective date of the document, the grantee was a bona
fide purchaser and the grantor received adequate and full consideration in money or moneys worth so that the joinder of the
nonexecuting spouse was not required under Sections 75-2-201
through 75-2-207;
(i) if the document purports to be executed pursuant to or to be a final
determination in a judicial or administrative proceeding, or to be executed
pursuant to a power of eminent domain, the court, official body, or
condemnor acted within its jurisdiction and all steps required for the
execution of the document were taken; and
(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document, including
without limitation recitals concerning mergers or name changes of organizations, are true.
(2) The presumptions stated in Subsection (1) arise even though the
document purports only to release a claim or to convey any right, title, or
interest of the person executing it or the person on whose behalf it is executed.
History: C. 1953, 57-4a-4, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 155, § 22; 1989, ch. 88, § 11.

75-7-816. Recitals when title to real property is in trust —
Failure.
(1) When title to real property is granted to a person as trustee, the terms
of the trust may be given either:
(a) in the deed of transfer; or
(b) in an instrument signed by the grantor and recorded in the same
office as the grant to the trustee.
(2) If the terms of the trust are not made public as required in Subsection
(1), a conveyance from the trustee is absolute in favor of purchasers for value
who take the property without notice of the terms of the trust.
(3) The terms of the trust recited in the deed of transfer or the instrument
recorded under Subsection (l)(b) shall include:
(a) the name of the trustee;
(b) the address of the trustee; and
(c) the name and date of the trust.
(4) Any real property titled in a trust which has a restriction on transfer
described in Section 25-6-14 shall include in the title the words "asset
protection trust."
History: C. 1953, 75-7-816, enacted by L.
2004, ch. 89, § 97.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2004, ch. 89, § 123
makes the act effective on July 1, 2004.

75-7-409. Recitals when title to real property is in trustee
— Failure.
(1) When title to real property is granted to a person as trustee, the terms of
the trust may be given either:
(a) in the deed of transfer; or
(b) in an instrument signed by the grantor and recorded in the same
office as the grant to the trustee.
(2) If the terms of the trust are not made public as required in Subsection
(1), a conveyance from the trustee is absolute in favor of purchasers for value
who take the property without notice of the terms of the trust.
l E t t f i t ? ™ ^ 9 ^ * 1 *
Compiler's Notes. - This section is not

l « t of the official text of the Uniform
^ ^ ^ Act

78-12-25. Within four years.
An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an open
account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last
payment is received;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections
of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1);
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14; 1996,
ch. 79, § 110.
Cross-References. — Antitrust Act actions,
§ 76-10-925.

Product Liability Act, statute of limitations,
§ 78-15-3.

78-40-1. Action to determine adverse claim to property —
Authorized,
An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an
e s ^ e o S e S in real proper^ or an interest or claim to personal property
adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim.
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^ - R e t r e n c e s . - Action brought in
county where property situated, » 78-13-1.
Allowance for improvements made under

color of title, ?§ 57-6-1 et seq., § 78-40-5.
Jurisdiction in district courts, Utah Const.,
Art. VIH S e c . & § 78-3-4
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